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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR RADIATION
INJURIES: MAUGHAN V SW SERVICING, INC.
Wrongful death suit filed alleging that leukemia that led to deaths
of plaintiffs' children and spouses between 1960 and 1973 was caused
by radiation emanating from a uranium processing plant. Given the
complexities of cancer causation, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the discovery rule should be liberally applied. Thus,
in cases involving suspected carcinogens, the statute of limitations
will be tolled until the plaintiff knows or should know of facts supporting the likelihood that one particular suspected carcinogen was
the cause of his cancer, and has identified the likely source of his
exposure to that carcinogen.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Actions for injuries from radiation exposure confront our legal system
more frequently than ever before and with more complex issues. Actions
founded upon radiation exposure often present a case of latent injury
because a victim may not discover the effects of contamination until many
years after exposure.' The latent nature of radiation injuries results in the
possibility that any action for redress of injuries may be barred by the
statute of limitations by the time a plaintiff learns of his injuries. Such
was the case in Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc.,2 where the 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals held that cases involving suspected carcinogens present
exceptional circumstances requiring application of the discovery rule.
Maughan concerned a vanadium3 processing plant that was built di1. Bodily injury may result from two types of exposure: either a sudden massive exposure to
radiation, or chronic low-level contamination. A massive exposure to radiation generally causes
obvious signs of injury within a short time. G. HUTrON, LEGAL CONSIDERATION ON IONIZING RADIATION 25-29 (1966). While some damage to the cells occurs at the time of radiation exposure, id.
at 29, chronic exposure to lower levels of radiation usually does not manifest symptoms in the victim
until years after the exposure. S. EsTEP, W. PIERCE, & E. STASON, ATOMS AND THE LAW 23 (hereinafter
cited as ATOMS]. The period of latency, during which no significant clinical symptoms appear, may
extend for 20 or more years. Bloom, Christovich, Cope, Cull, DeJamette, & McNeal, The Statute
of Limitations Problem in Relation to Atomic Energy Liability, 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 347, 354 (1959);
see Frenkel, ClinicalAspects of Nuclear Radiation Exposure, 5 FORUM 188, 196 (1970). Cancer,
fetal damage, genetic damage, sterility, and a decreased life expectancy are among the possible
results of radiation exposure. EsTEP, supra, at 28-35.
2. 758 F. 2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1985).
3. Vanadium is a soft, ductile, silver-grey metal. THE NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, (W. Harris
and J. Levey, eds. 1975). It forms numerous compounds, including vandates and complex organic
compounds. The principal use of vanadium is in alloys, especially with steel. In the United States
vanadium ores are mined in Arizona, Colorado, and Utah. Id.
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rectly adjacent to a small community in Monticello, Utah in 1940.' The
plant was conveyed to the United States Government which used it to
process uranium when the ore was discovered in the area in the late
1940's.' In 1956, SW Servicing, Inc. took over the operation under a
contract with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The plant closed
in 1960 after the supply of uranium ran out. 6 Between 1961 and 1962
the mill was dismantled and the land revegetated. 7
Beginning in 1956, six Monticello residents, mostly children, contracted and eventually died of leukemia. 8 The last known death occurred
in 1973. Because Monticello is a small town, this incidence of leukemia
is greater than statistically probable.'0
Consequently, decedent's heirs and relatives filed a wrongful death suit
on August 28, 1980, alleging that the leukemia which led to the deaths
of their children and spouses was caused by radiation emanating from
the mill operated by SW Servicing, Inc." Defendants moved for and
were granted summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions had run.' 2 The United States District
Court for the District of Utah stated, ". . . [p]laintiffs had knowledge of
both the deaths and the cause" 3 and "[t]he effect of the radiation exposure
in the decedents ceased to be latent at the time the leukemia was diagnosed."' 4 The court then summarily concluded this case ". . . was no
different than a typical wrongful death case." 5" The 10th Circuit reversed,
holding that in cases involving suspected carcinogens, the statute of limitations must be tolled until the plaintiff knows or should know of the
following. First, plaintiff must recognize the facts supporting the likelihood that one particular suspected carcinogen was the cause of his cancer,
and second, plaintiff must identify the likely source of his exposure to
that carcinogen. 16
4. Brief for Appellants at 2-3, Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F. 2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1985).
Monticello is located in the southeastern part of Utah, less than 100 miles from the four comers
area.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id.
7. Brief for Appellees at 6, Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F. 2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1985).
8. Brief for Appellant at 3. Between 1960 and 1967, there were four childhood leukemia deaths
in Monticello. Between 1968 and 1973, three more cases of leukemia were diagnosed. (As of July,
1978, one former resident was battling for his life in Salt Lake City, Utah.)
9. Maughan v. NL Industries, No. 80-0475, slip. op. at 2 (D. Utah June 29, 1982).
10. In the 1960s, Monticello had a population of approximately 1900. The statistical probability
of such an outbreak is less than one in a thousand. Thus, this outbreak represented a leukemia
cluster. Public Health Service Report EPI-67-48-2, Ex. 33, p. 4.
11. 758 F. 2d at 1383.
12. Id. The parties stipulated that, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-36(1) (1953), the statute
of limitations was tolled as to the minor plaintiffs and their claims were timely filed.
13. Maughan v. NL Industries, No. 80-0475, slip op. at 7 (D. Utah, June 29, 1982).
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id. at 1387.
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This case note will examine the articulation, application, and implication of the "discovery rule" presented in Maughan. The analysis begins
with a review of the court's opinion. This will be followed by a review
of the basic principles underlying the statute of limitations and discovery
rule. Next, Utah decisions applying the discovery rule will be analyzed
to determine whether Maughan is a consistent step in the development
of the rule. Finally, an analysis of Maughan and its significance will be
presented.
THE COURT'S OPINION
The court of appeals in Maughan began its opinion by noting that Utah
has adopted statutes of limitations "to promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared." 17 The court then stated the general rule that the statute of
limitations begins to run upon the happening of the last event necessary
to complete the action, regardless of whether the plaintiff knows of the
existence of the cause of action. 8 If the court had chosen to apply this
rule, then the statute would have begun to run at the death of each victim
and the claims would thus be time barred.
Instead, the court described and applied the "discovery rule," as defined by Utah courts, which tolls the statute of limitations under the
following circumstances:
(1) When the discovery rule has been adopted by statute in that particular area of law;
(2) When "a party has concealed facts or misled the potential plaintiff,
the statute is tolled until the plaintiff knows or should know of the relevant
facts"; and
(3) When "there are exceptional circumstances that would make ap""
plication of the general rule irrational or unjust ...
In this case, Utah has not adopted the discovery rule by statute; and
there are no allegations of concealment or misrepresentation . 2' Thus, the
court of appeals indicated that plaintiffs' claim "is time barred unless it
to which the Utah Supreme Court
presents an 'exceptional circumstance'
21
would apply the discovery rule."
To determine whether exceptional circumstances are present the court
17. 758 F. 2d
1981)), (quoting
34849 (1944)).
18. 758 F. 2d
19. 758 F. 2d
20. Id.
21. Id.

1381, 1383 (10th Cir. 1985), (citing Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84,86 (Utah
Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
at 1384, see Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983).
at 1384.
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invoked a balancing test.22 This balancing methodology encompasses a
weighing of the hardship that the statute of limitations would impose on
the plaintiffs given the facts of the case, against the possible prejudice
to the defendant from the difficulties of proof caused by the passage of
time.23
This court concluded that "cases involving suspected carcinogens present 'exceptional circumstances,' justifying application of the discovery
rule for three reasons." ' 24 First, the court found that the scientific data
concerning causation of cancer is very complex. 25 That is, there are many
suspected causes of cancer and even if a plaintiff "attempts to determine
the cause of the disease, he is confronted with a mass of complex,
controversial and rapidly changing scientific data and opinions." 2 6 Second, the knowledge and understanding of the potential plaintiffs and
potential defendants is significantly different .27 Hence, a person who
suffers from cancer may not understand that the illness may have been
caused by unnatural elements. Finally, the long latency period of the
disease makes it difficult for a plaintiff to determine whether he was
exposed to potential carcinogens, and if so, when and where the exposure
occurred. 2 8 Because of these three factors the court concluded that the
hardship imposed by the statute of limitations for wrongful deaths outweighs the difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time; therefore,
the court tolled the statute.
In addition, the court of appeals noted that a rule which encourages
the filing of lawsuits when one develops cancer but has no knowledge
of its cause, is inconsistent with the position that unfounded claims should
be discouraged.29 That is, to rule that the statute begins to run at the time
the disease develops would encourage the parties who have relevant
information to delay disclosure until after the statute has run." ° Moreover,
the court of appeals deferred to the Utah legislature which has explicitly
tipped the balance in favor of tolling where a potential plaintiff is under
a disability, regardless of the difficulties of proof.3' The court found the
balance in cases involving suspected carcinogens to be similarly in favor
of tolling.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 1385.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1385-1386.
Id.at 1386.
Id.
Id.(citing
toUTAH STAT. ANN. § 78-12-36).
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Because the court held the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations
until the plaintiff knows or should know of the facts constituting the cause
of action, the question arises as to when plaintiffs should have been aware
of the existence of their cause of action. It is settled law in the majority
of circuits that the issue of when a plaintiff knows or should have known
of the cause of action is a question of fact for the jury.32 Thus, the court
of appeals remanded the case for a determination as to when the survivors
knew or should have known of the facts constituting their cause of action."
LEGAL BACKGROUND
History
Statutes of limitations are characteristically based on the proposition
that persons who sleep on their right to commence a lawsuit may lose
that right after a specified period of time.34 Thus, a statute of limitations
can effectively deprive a person of the opportunity to pursue an otherwise
valid claim. 35 Because the common law imposes no limit on the time in
which an action must be brought, any time limitation placed on the action
is the result of statutory enactment.3 6
Statutes of limitations are designed to protect a defendant against a
claim after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared,
and evidence has been lost. 37 They are based primarily on policy con-

siderations of fairness to the defendant. 38 Thus, statutes of limitations
serve three purposes: (1) providing repose for the defendant;39 (2) en-

32. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
33. 758 F.2d at 1389.
34. See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944). In
Railway Express, the United States Supreme Court determined that the statute of limitations did not
bar a wage claim that was commenced in a timely manner but not filed until seven years later. Id.
The Court found that the justification for a statute of limitations is the right of a defendant to be
free of stale claims even if those claims are just. Id.
35. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945). The Court in Donaldson noted that
some jurisdictions view statutes of limitations as "extinguishing the claim and destroying the right"
to bring an action, while others view statutes of limitations as doing no more than cutting "off resort
to the courts for enforcement of the claim." Id. at 313.
36. The defense of laches is different from the defense of statute of limitations. Laches is a
doctrine peculiarly applicable to suits in equity, and is independent of the statute of limitations,
which, unless otherwise provided by law, applies to legal actions only. See e.g., Jones v. McGonigle,
327 Mo 457, 37 SW 2d 892 (1931).
37. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express, 321 U.S. at 349 (1944). See United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (purpose of statute of limitations "is to encourage the
prompt presentment of claims").
38. Bumett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (applying a federal statute of
limitations). Developments in the Law-Statutes ofLimitations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950).
39. See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express, 321 U.S. at 349 (1944) ("[elven
if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of
).
limitation ....

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 26

couraging diligence on the part of the plaintiff in asserting his or her
rights;' and (3) safeguarding against adjudication based upon stale evidence. 41
This casenote is concerned with tort actions4 2 for which most statutes
state that the statutory period will begin to run when a cause of action
"accrues."'" Until the 1950s, courts consistently held that a cause of
action accrued on the occurrence of a tortious act, regardless of the tort
victim's knowledge of the injury." Shortly thereafter courts became concerned that a strict application of limitation statutes left those plaintiffs
that were blamelessly ignorant of their causes of action and latent injuries
without a legal remedy.45
As early as 1949, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
mechanical application of statutes of limitations could lead to inequitable
results when the plaintiff was unaware of his injury until after the statutory
period had run.' In Urie v. Thompson, 47 a steam locomotive fireman filed
suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,48 alleging that his continuous inhalation of silica dust had caused disability. The Urie Court,
40. Taylor, Occupational Disease: A Defense Attorney's Point of View, 12 FORUM 297, 300-01
(1976) (plaintiff's diligence is required because, at some point, the filing of a complaint becomes
so distant from the situation which gave rise to the claim as to make the burden of defense intolerable).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. I 11,117 (1979) ("[T~he search for truth may
be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses,
fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise").
42. Other actions such as contract actions have different statutes of limitations.
43. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1200 (1950). A
typical statute of limitations states that the period within which a suit may be brought is calculated
from the time the "cause of action accrues." Id. Legislatures have adopted a concept delineating
the combination of facts or events that create a cause of action. Id. The occurrence of the last of
these requisite facts is, therefore, the point at which the cause of action accrues. Id.
44. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172, 181 (1830) (statute of limitations begins
to run on date of attorney's negligent act, not when loss is discovered); Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110
F.2d 628, 629 (4th Cir. 1940) (cause of action accrued at time doctor left sponge in patient, not
when it was discovered); Kennedy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 135 Conn. 176, 178-79, 62 A.
2d 771, 772 (1948) (cause of action for negligent installation accrued when insulation was installed,
not when walls cracked and leaked); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287,
300, 200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936) (cause of action accrues when injury occurs; injury was defined as
wrongful invasion of personal rights. Thus, plaintiff's negligence claim for pneumonconiosis arose
the first time he breathed dust that caused disease).
45. See, e.g., Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Hawaii 150, 153, 433 P.2d 220, 223 (1967) (to bar
plaintiff's action before he is aware that he has a claim is patent injustice.); Myrick v. James, 444
A. 2d 987, 994 (Me. 1982) (manifest injustice to bar plaintiff's claim because he is unaware of
medical malpratice until after limitations period); Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 616, 411 N.E.
2d 458, 463 (1980) (unjust to punish "blameless ignorance" by ruling a malpractice action is
timebarred before the plaintiff reasonably could have known he has suffered a harm). See generally
Annot., 80 A.L.R. 3d 368, 387-400 (1961) (discussion of various approaches to adopting discovery
rule).
46. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
47. Id.
48. Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1982).
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declaring that a plaintiff should not be deprived of a remedy merely
because of his blameless ignorance of his condition, held that the action
did not accrue until "'effects of the deleterious substance [manifested]
themselves.' ""'
Influenced by Urie, many jurisdictions have adopted a "discovery rule"
for cases in which an injury does not manifest itself for a considerable
amount of time after the defendant's actions.5" The "discovery rule"
delays the accrual of a cause of action to the time the plaintiff discovered,
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the
injury for which the defendant was responsible. 5 Initially, most jurisdictions limited use of the discovery rule to medical malpractice cases;52 but
gradually use of the discovery rule has been extended to other situations
in which strict application of the statute of limitations would preclude
plaintiffs from litigating over injuries sustained. 3 That is, the time for
49. 337 U.S. at 170 (quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 124 Cal.
App. 378, 381, 12 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1932)). Although the Court did not decide Urie as a due process
case, that issue is at least implicated in the decision. Indeed Justice Faulkner, in Garrett v. Ratheon
Co., 368 So.2d 516, 524 (Ala. 1979), argued that the result reached by the majority was contrary
to art. 1,section 13 of the Alabama constitution which provides that "'every person, for any injury
done him, in his .. .person . .. shall have a remedy by due process of law.
Garrett v.
Ratheon Co., 368 So. 2d at 524 (1979) (Faulkner, dissenting).
50. See, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Corp., 523 F 2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestosis); Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974),
(mesothelioma); Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir.
1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968), (attorney malpractice); Grigsby v. Sterling Drug Inc., 428
F. Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd mem., 543 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 431 U.S.
967 (1977), (latent side effects of drug); Miller v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 204 Kan. 184, 460 P.2d
535 (1969) (emphysema and pulmonary fibrosis); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md.
70, 394 A. 2d 299 (1978) (mesothelioma). But cf. Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala.
1979) (denying judicial adoption of discovery rule for injuries resulting from radiation exposure);
Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y. 2d 780, 391 N.E. 2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S. 2d 920 (1979)
(refusing to apply foreign-objects discovery rule to radium injected into plaintiff's body).
51. The term "discovery rule" encompasses subtle variations among jurisdictions on the event
that triggers the statute of limitations. In Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A. 2d
170 (1977), the court noted that while the discovery rule usually is phrased in terms of the injured
party's discovery of both his injury and the relationship between his injury and the tort feasors's
conduct, in some cases courts stated simply that the statute of limitations began running under the
discovery rule when the plaintiff discovered his injury. Id. at 174. The Raymond court found that
in cases using the latter formulation of the rule, the nature of the "injury" alerts plaintiffs that their
rights have been violated. Id. at 174. The court concluded that the former formulation of the rule
was preferable in latent disease cases because injury and discovery of a causal relationship do not
occur simultaneously. Id. at 170-71, 371 A. 2d at 174.
52. Comment, Preserving Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases, 68 VA. L.REv. 615, 624
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Latent Disease Cases]; see, e.g. Burke v. Washington Hosp. Center,
293 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1968); Shillady v. Elliot Community Hosp., 114 N.H. 321, 320 A. 2d
637 (1974); GA CODE ANN. § 9-3-72 (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.105 (West. Supp. 1982); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (1981).
53. See, e.g., Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1976) cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1038 (1977), (injuries caused by oral contraceptives); Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley,
284 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960) (berylliosis); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394
A. 2d 299 (1978) (mesothelioma).
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filing suit may be tolled while a plaintiff is ignorant of his cause of action
due to the inherently undiscoverable nature of the injury.54 This expansion
of the use of the discovery rule includes latent injury cases.55
Utah law
Utah law16 imposes statutes of limitations for various actions.5 7 Utah
imposes a two year limit for wrongful death actions. 8 Most of the statutes
were silent as to tolling provisions, so throughout the years, the Utah
Supreme Court and the Utah Legislature have created tolling standards
in a number of different situations.59
In fact, the Utah Supreme Court expressly adopted the discovery rule
in Christiansen v. Rees.' This was a foreign object medical malpractice
case in which the plaintiff filed the complaint after the traditional limitations period had run. 6 ' The court reviewed neighboring states' decisions
and concluded that "the cause of action does not accrue until62 the patient
learned of the presence of such foreign object in his body."
The Utah Legislature responded to Christiansenand the modem trend
in other jurisdictions by adopting a discovery rule for malpractice actions. 63 This statute was subsequently supplanted by the "Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act," ' which retains the discovery rule.65 Yet further
54. See, e.g., Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 79-80, 394 A. 2d 299, 305
(1978); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 170, 371 A.2d 170, 174 (1977) (discovery
rule avoids "harsh and illogical consequences" by outlawing the plaintiff's claim before he could
have known it existed).
55. Latent Disease Cases, supra note 52, at 625. For a summary of statutes and case law in each
state, see McGovem, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in ProductLiability
Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM 416, 422-423, 438-50 (1980).
56. Jurisdiction in Maughan is based on diversity of citizenship. The general rule is that a federal
court will apply the applicable state statutory period of limitations, as would a state court, in a
diversity of citizenship case. When a federal court adopts the state period of limitations, it will
adopt, as a rule, the entire framework of the state's law, including statutory provisions relating to
tolling and the like, and the judicial construction and interpretation thereof. See, e.g., Security Trust
Co. v. Black River Nat. Bank, 187 U.S. 211 (1902). Yet when a suit is in federal court on a federally
created cause of action and there is a federal period of limitations applicable, the courts uniformly
apply the federal period and, if they exist, the federal rules on tolling and other ancillary matters.
See, e.g., Bumett v. New York Cent. R.Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1964).
57. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-1 (1953).
58. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28 (1953).

59. The Utah legislature has expressly adopted the discovery rule for actions for waste, trespass
or injury to real property, taking or injuring personal property, and for fraud or mistake. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-12-26 (1953). The Utah supreme court has held that proof or concealment or misleading
by the defendant precludes the defendant from relying on the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Rice
v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969); Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583
P.2d 105 (Utah 1978).
60. 20 Utah 2d 199, 200, 436 P.2d 435, 436 (1968).
61. Id. at 199, 436 P.2d at 435.
62. Id. at 200, 436 P.2d at 436.
63. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-28 (1953).
64. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-14-1-11 (1953).
65. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-14-4 (1953).
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refinement and interpretation was needed to precisely define the tolling
standard.'
Consequently, in Foil v. Ballinger,67 the Utah Supreme Court supplied
a precise definition of the discovery rule, which is currently the accepted
tolling standard in Utah. 6 ' This court held that "the statute begins to run
when an injured person knows or should know that he has suffered a
legal injury."' 69 Foil concerned a medical malpractice action filed after
the applicable statute of limitations had run.7" In Foil, plaintiff contended
that the limitations period did not commence at the time she was aware
of her injury, which was shortly after the negligently performed operation.
Rather, the limitations period began to run at the time plaintiff first became
aware of the relationship between her injuries and the alleged negligent
act. 7 Plaintiff did not become aware of the relationship until a medical
panel issued a report indicating that the operation was the cause. 72 The
supreme court agreed with plaintiff and reversed the summary judgment
granted in favor of the defendant.73 The court went on to define discovery
of legal injury as "discovery of injury and the negligence which resulted
in the injury.""
The Foil court discussed policy reasons supporting this tolling standard.
That is, the court noted the difference in knowledge that often exists
between plaintiff and defendant,75 the prevention of the filing of unjustified
lawsuits," and the avoidance of the temptation to fail to disclose information about possible negligent acts, 77 as policy reasons behind its decision.
In 1981, the Utah Supreme Court extended the discovery rule to a
66. See Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 147.
69. Id. at 147.
70. Id. at 145.
71. Id. at 147.
72. Id. at 146.
73. Id. at 148.
74. Id. at 148.
75. "While the recipient may be aware of a disability or dysfunction, there may be, to the
untutored understanding of the average layman, no apparent connection between the treatment
provided by a physician and the injury suffered. Even if there is, [a connection], it may be passed
off as an unavoidable side effect or a side effect that will pass with time .... But when injuries are
suffered that have been caused by an unknown act of negligence by an expert, the law ought not
be construed to destroy a right of action before a person even becomes aware of the existence of
that right." Id. at 147.
76. ". . . to adopt a construction ... that encourages a person who experiences an injury ...
and has no knowledge of its cause, to file a lawsuit against a health care provider to prevent a statute
of limitations from running is not consistent with the inarguably sound proposition that unfounded
claims should be strongly discouraged. One of the chief purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act was to prevent the filing of unjustified lawsuits .
"d.
I.."
at 148.
77. "The law should foster a fulfillment of the duty to disclose so that proper remedial measures
can be taken and damage ameliorated." Id. at 148.
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wrongful death case in Myers v. McDonald.78 Myers concerned a ward
killed in an automobile accident without any identification. Plaintiffs did
not discover the cause of their ward's death until after the statute had
run.79 The court held that the policy against stale claims was outweighed
by the unique circumstances of the guardian's hardship.8 °
With respect to latent injury cases, Utah and several other jurisdictions
recognize exceptions to statutes of limitations that justify application of
the discovery rule.8 Applying the applicable statutory period without
allowing for tolling requires a showing by defendant that each plaintiff
knew or should have known both the cause of the injury and who negligently inflicted the injury after the statute had run. The final decision
of whether a reasonable person in plaintiff's position knew or should
have known the cause of the injury is a question of fact for the jury.82
78. 635 P. 2d 84 (Utah 1981).
79. In a wrongful death action, Utah courts will apply a two year statute of limitations. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-12-28 (1953).
80. Plaintiffs alleged that despite their efforts to discover the whereabouts of their ward, they had
no knowledge of his death and therefore had no knowledge that a cause of action existed until after
the two year limitation period had expired. The court stated that plaintiffs had no alternative other
than to bring their action after the statutory period had expired. 635 P.2d at 86-87.
81. Federal courts will toll the statute of limitations in latent injury cases, provided the court is
interpreting the substantive state law as allowing for the application of the discovery rule. See, e.g.,
Dawson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 543 F. Supp. 1330, 1339 (D.C.C. 1982), (Held, the purpose of the
discovery rule is to prevent the accrual of a cause of action before one can reasonably be expected
to know of the cause of action. Thus, the statute of limitations should not begin to run until one
knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that the injury is the result of
wrongdoing.); Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731, 735 (10th Cir. 1980), (Held, the statute of
limitations does not commence until the plaintiff knows, or as a reasonable person should know,
that he has the disability and that the defendant caused it); Allen v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 476
(D. Utah 1981), (Held, in exceptional circumstances or causes of action where the application of
the general rule would be irrational or unjust, the statute of limitations will be tolled until plaintiff
knows or with due diligence should know of his cause of action). Although the trend today is toward
use of the discovery rule in latent injury cases, some jurisdictions employ other standards to determine
when a cause of action accrues. Under one such standard, often called the "first breath" rule, the
plaintiff is considered to be injured and the statute of limitations commences when a toxic substance
first enters the plaintiff's body. (See Comment, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in
Latent Injury Claims;An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 501, 505-06 (1982) ([hereinafter
cited as Exception or the Law]. New York is one of the few jurisdictions that still uses this standard.
See, e.g., Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y. 2d 780, 391 N.E. 2d 1002, (1972). Because latent
diseases usually are not diagnosable until many years after the initial exposure, the "first breath"
standard bars virtually all latent disease claims. This approach has been criticized by the commentators. See Birnbaum, First Breath's ' Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products Laibility Cases,
13 FORUM 279, 284 (1977). This rule is similar to the old rule that a cause of action accrued on the
occurrence of a tortious act, regardless of the tort victim's knowledge of the injury. See supra note
44 and accompanying text. Other jurisdictions, following the "last breath" doctrine, hold that when
exposure to a toxic substance continues over a period of time, the cause of action accrues at the
time of the last exposure. See, Exception or the Law, supra, at 507; see, e.g., Garrett v. Raytheon
Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979); Everhart v. Rich's Inc., 229 Ga. 798, 194 SE 2d 425 (1972).
Finally, the "continuing tort" rule is an analytical variation of the last breath doctrine. The continuing
tort rule provides that each exposure to a harmful substance gives rise to a new cause of action.
See, Latent Disease Cases, supra note 52 at 623.
82. See, e.g., Dawson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 543 F. Supp. 1330 (D.C. 1982); Williams v. Borden,
Inc., 637 F.2d 731, 738 (10th Cir. 1980); Ballew v. A.H. Robins Co., 668 F.2d 1325 (1lth Cir.
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ANALYSIS

Propriety of the Discovery Rule
The problem of limitations is serious in radiation exposure cases because exposure to radiation may cause no perceptible or significant injury
at the time of exposure, but may manifest its impact in such serious
ailments as cancer or leukemia perhaps as many as thirty years from the
date of exposure. 83 Moreover, fetal damage, genetic damage, sterility,
and a decreased life expectancy are among the possible results of radiation
exposure. 84 Because a typical statutory limitation reduces the time between the accrual of the right and the commencement of the action to a
relatively short fixed interval, many potential claimants are barred from
recovery before they are even aware they have claims.8"
For these reasons, the court's adoption of the discovery rule in this
latent disease case is not surprising. The trend is clearly in the direction
of tolling the statute of limitations until a plaintiff knows or should know
of the injury for which the defendant is responsible. 6 This trend has
received support from legal scholars, who assert that use of the discovery
rule is equitable and consistent with basic principles of tort recovery.87

Moreover, the purposes of statutes of limitation88 are not undermined
if a claim for a latent illness is made when the illness is discovered or
when its cause is discovered rather than when the injury or even last
exposure occurs. The purpose of encouraging diligence on the part of
plaintiffs is not furthered by a statute of limitations when the plaintiff is
unaware of his injury until after the statutory period has run. Also, the
evidentiary consideration justifying statutes of limitations does not apply
with full force in latent disease cases, because evidence tends to develop
1982) (reversing summary judgment for factual determination as to whether plaintiff should have
known that her injuries were caused by an intrauterine device prior to the time when she was
expressly informed of the casual connection by other plaintiffs and their attorney); Lundy v. Union
Carbide Corp., 695 F. 2d 394 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding factual dispute as to whether plaintiff knew
his condition was caused by exposure to asbestos, even though plaintiff himself had suggested, prior
to expiration of the limitations period, that asbestos might be the cause); Renfroe V. Eli Lilly &
Co., 686 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding refusal to grant summary judgment on question of
whether plaintiff should have known that DES caused her cancer).
83. See supra note 1.
84. See supra note 1.
85. See supra note 44.
86. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 476 (D. Utah 1981); Dawson v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 543 F. Supp. 1330 (D.C. 1982); Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F. 2d 731 (10th Cir. 1980);
Lundy v. Union Carbid6 Corp., 695 F. 2d 394 (9th Cir. 1982).
87. See, e.g., Demidovich, Civil Procedure-ProductLiability-Statute ofLimitations-Survival and
Wrongful Death Statutes-Manifestationof One Asbestos Related DiseaseDoes Not Trigger the Statute
of Limitations on All Separate and Later Manifested Diseases Endangered by the Same Asbestos
Exposure. 52 CINN. L. REv. 239, 250 (1983). Statutes of limitation tend to promote the peace and
welfare of society, safeguard against fraud and oppression, and compel the settlement of claims
within a reasonable period. See Baron v. Kum, 349 Mo. 1202, 164 S.W.2d 310 (1942).
88. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text for listing of the purposes of statutes of
limitations.
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as time passes rather than disappear. Arguably, even repose in the sense
of relief from uncertainty caused by potential liability is not always served
by a typical statute of limitations in latent injury cases. For example, a
defendant who is unaware that his product causes latent injuries cannot
be said to gain repose from a time limit placed on his unforeseen liability.
One of the difficulties created by applying the "exceptional circumstances" test to determine application of the discovery rule is the case
by case factual analysis required. The Maughan court did not define when
a case will present such "exceptional circumstances" so as to justify
application of the discovery rule. The opinion states: ". . . this court
concludes that cases involving suspected carcinogens present exceptional
circumstances ...."89 Unfortunately, the court does not give any definitions of "suspected" or "carcinogens," nor does the opinion lay out
any criteria for determining when an exceptional circumstance is present.
Implicit in the court's reasoning is an indication that exceptional circumstances exist when there is complexity of data concerning causation of
cancer, a disparity of knowledge between potential plaintiffs and defendants, and a long latency period of the disease.' The issues left unanswered
by Maughan are whether exceptional circumstances always exist when
the above three elements occur, whether carcinogen cases always present
as a matter of law "exceptional circumstances" thereby invoking application of the discovery rule, and what criteria can be used to decide
whether a particular situation presents an exceptional circumstance.
Policy
The Maughan court specifically looks at the consequences of applying
the typical statute of limitations to these claims. That is, to rule that the
right to make a claim commences as soon as an injured party becomes
aware that a particular item is suspected of causing cancer is irrational
because it forces injured parties to sue all sources of carcinogens simply
to prevent the statute from running. that a particular substance is suspected
to cause cancer.9 This, in turn, would result in a dismissal of the suit
on grounds of frivolity, Also, the purpose of statutes of limitation is to
protect against actions which have grown old; they are not for the purpose
of stimulating actions.9"
The court, in effect, is applying notions of preservation of judicial
economy and integrity. Moreover, the court implicitly reaffirms the policy
of timely and truthful disclosure when it states that refusing to apply the
89.
90.
91.
92.

Maughan v. S.W. Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d at 1385.
Id.
Id. at 1387.
Id. at 1387 (citing Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, (D. Utah 1984)).
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discovery rule will encourage parties with relevant information to delay
disclosure until after the statututory period has expired. 9'
While the above are very important policy reasons mandating application of the discovery rule, other significant policy reasons do exist.
The goal of a tort action is to place the economic burden of the injury
on the party at fault. 94 Yet this practice of shifting the cost of injury is
undermined absent a reasonable statute of limitations. Additionally, the
use of the typical statute of limitation reduces employer incentives to
eliminate radiation emissions from the environment. 95 That is, application
of typical statutes of limitations releases the employer from a direct
economic incentive to remove known carcinogenic emissions. Commencing the statute at the point in time when the victim discovers or
reasonably should discover that he has an illness will retain a needed
incentive to improve the health conditions of the environment.
Other Solutions
A system by which tort and wrongful death claims can be terminated
more easily on the pleadings could be developed. Such a system has been
developed and implemented successfully in California and Illinois. These
courts require plaintiffs to state in their complaint the date of the discovery,
the circumstances surrounding the discovery, and specific facts showing
that the inability to make an earlier discovery was reasonable and not a
result of the plaintiff's failure to investigate. 96 Under the California and
Illinois approaches, mere assertions that the delayed discovery was reasonable are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.97 By allowing
late claims to be dismissed as a matter of law, where they are insufficiently
plead in the complaint, the expense, time, and frustration of discovery
and further litigation would be avoided. This procedure may promote
both the fairness and efficiency with which our judicial system is concerned.
Another solution is to prescribe longer statutes of limitations in radiation exposure cases. Idaho, for example, has the following statute of
limitations for radiation injuries: three years from knowledge or when
93. Maughan v. S.W. Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d at 1386.
94. Peters, Occupational Carcinogenesis and Statutes of Limitation: Resolving Relevant Policy
Goals, 10 ENVTL. L. 113, 152 (1979).
95. Id. at 154.
96. See Saliter v. Pierce Bros. Mortuaries, 81 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 292, 297, 146 Cal. Rptr. 271,
274 (1978); Dujardin v. Ventura County Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal. App. 3d 350, 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. 20,
22 (1977); Pratt v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 71 111. App. 3d 825, 829, 390 N.E. 2d 471, 475 (I11.
App. 1979).
97. See Saliter v. Pierce Bros. Mortuaries, 81 Cal. App. 3d 292, 297, 146 Cal. Rptr. 271, 275
(1978); Pratt V. Sears Roebuck & Co., 71 111. App. 3d 825, 829, 390 N.E. 2d 471, 475 (1979).
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the plaintiffs should have knowledge of the injury and the cause, but not
more than thirty years from the last occurrence to which the injury is
attributed. 98
As the preceding discussion indicates, in the context of latent injury
claims, the rigidity of statutes of limitations threatens unjust results in
many cases. Statutes of limitations were developed to deal with the traditional concept of a cause of action, and therefore the strict application
to nontraditional claims produces unnecessarily harsh results. Thus, when
traditional legal concepts no longer conform with modem conditions,
courts should exercise flexibility with respect to application of these rules.
In latent injury cases, the use of the discovery rule is one such flexible
and rational response.
CONCLUSION
Today, the necessity of the discovery rule is beyond question. Care
must be taken in its articulation and application, however, to ensure the
consistent, fair, and efficient operation of our judicial system. That is,
while society recognizes the need to compensate persons injured by radioactive emission, this need does not support the implementation of a
discovery rule that could lead to unlimited liability for defendants.
As Maughan indicates, in the case of suspected carcinogens, policies
of recovery and statutes of limitations are conflicting. To resolve the
conflict there must be a balancing of interests. Tolling a statute until a
plaintiff knows or should know both the fact of death and the cause of
death allows such a balance. The discovery rule is a necessary judicial
tool in our complex and every changing society because it implements
the optimal balance between compensating injured plaintiffs and preserving timely claims.
SUSAN H. BIERNACKI

98. IDAHO CODE § 5-243 (1949). Moreover, the problem of limitations in radiation exposure cases
is dealt with abroad by nuclear liability laws in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United
Kingdom which provide thirty years as the maximum limitation period for nuclear injuries. Cavers,
Improving FinancialProtection of the Public Against the Hazards of Nuclear Power, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 644, 657 (1964).

